Circuit Split Alerter

Whether a price-premium/price-inflation theory, without individualized proof of deception or reliance, can satisfy the ‘ascertainable loss’ or injury requirement and allow predominance for class certification in consumer-protection suits (including under the MMPA).

Whether a federal district court possesses inherent/ancillary authority to impose a standalone custodial no-contact order (an injunction restricting a defendant’s communications while imprisoned) after the oral pronouncement of sentence.

Whether a plaintiff in a Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) whistle-blower suit must prove the employer’s retaliatory intent/animus to satisfy the statute’s “contributing-factor” causation element.

Whether a federally licensed firearms dealer is a federal official/agent whose statements can trigger the entrapment-by-estoppel defense under Raley v. Ohio and Cox v. Louisiana.

Whether penetration of a pubescent minor with a foreign object is per se ‘sadistic’ under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(4)(A) or requires a case-specific assessment of pain or humiliation.

Whether a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness may arise from a prosecutor’s decision to file additional or more serious charges during the pre-trial / plea-bargaining stage (e.g., after a defendant files a suppression motion or declines a plea offer).

What substantive test governs whether an individualized education program (IEP) provides a Free Appropriate Public Education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).

Proper judicial standard for reviewing an ERISA plan-administrator’s benefits denial when the plan grants discretionary authority.

Whether § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides a private cause of action for retaliation against employees who oppose disability discrimination or request accommodations.

Whether federal courts have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) to review the Board of Immigration Appeals’ determination that a VAWA petitioner failed to show the “extraordinary circumstances” necessary to waive the time-limit for an untimely motion to reopen under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III).

At what point in the cancellation-of-removal process must a qualifying relative be a “child” (under 21) for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D)?

Whether, in evaluating a successive habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii), a court may consider new evidence that is not itself connected to (i.e., ‘rooted in’) the asserted constitutional violation.

Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) may constitutionally impose a categorical, permanent firearm ban on all felons after N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, or whether the statute must be evaluated case-by-case through as-applied Second Amendment challenges.

Whether a district-court or agency order denying a motion to seal is categorically appealable under the collateral-order doctrine or only appealable on a case-specific basis.

Proper analytical framework for as-applied Second Amendment challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) after NYSRPA v. Bruen